Time after time: 20 years of negotiations in Venezuela

Time after time: 20 years of negotiations in Venezuela

Photo: Sofía Jaimes Barreto

 

On August 13th, 2021, chavismo and the opposition begin a new attempt at political dialogue. The regime wants sanctions relief; the opposition, elections. Let’s remember the milestones of a frustrating history of talks.

By Caracas ChroniclesPedro Graterol

Aug 12, 2021

August 2001: The Calm Before the Storm

  • Actors: Chávez’s government and the business sector.

When FEDECÁMARAS, Venezuela’s most relevant business chamber, reacted against the changes in economic policy deployed after the implementation of the 1999 Constitution, Pedro Carmona, then president of the chamber, met with the government after an invitation from President Hugo Chávez, to convene in an attempt to ease tensions between the two groups. This dialogue effort was mostly led by the business sector; political parties couldn’t agree on what to do. However, it failed to the point that, in December 2001, the government passed 49 laws that increased expropriations and controls, which contributed to the political crisis that ended – in April 2002 – with Carmona declaring himself president for two strange days.





September 2002 to July 2003: Boston Group Talks

  • Actors: Chavista and opposition deputies of the National Assembly and a delegation from the U.S Congress.

After the coup attempt in April 2002, the National Assembly (AN) and the U.S. Congress formed the Boston Group, a cooperation network between the two legislative bodies. The AN delegation included chavistas and opposition members.

There were only two meetings, to discuss improvements in the conditions of democracy, poverty, and the role of the media (a very heated subject after the April events). The group faded after the 2005 boycott of the National Assembly elections by the opposition.

May 2003: Forum for Negotiation and Agreement 

  • Actors: Chávez’s government, the opposition, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Carter Center, and OAS Secretary-General Cesar Gaviria.

In parallel to the Boston Group talks, opposition and government representatives agreed to meet with delegations of the UNDP, the Carter Center, and the OAS. These talks didn’t fall apart and allowed for the Carter Center to act as a liaison between government and opposition to agree on electoral conditions. This mission also started projects against polarization and political confrontation at the grassroots level that outlived the national discussions.

Gaviria had a 22-point plan, but negotiations revolved around an electoral solution to the crisis and ended with an agreement to hold a recall referendum of Chávez in 2004, which reassured Chávez´s mandate and further divided the opposition.

January 2011: Dialogue Attempt around the Enabling Law

  • Actors: Chávez’s government and the opposition

Towards the end of its term, the chavismo-controlled National Assembly granted Chávez an Enabling Law for 18 months. This happened during the largest oil boom in recent history, as the price of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil averaged $94.87 per barrel. The opposition claimed that the law granted Chávez dictatorial powers and that the move was to undermine their win of 40% of the legislature for the 2011-2016 term. Per the proverbial tira y encoge, that classic technique Chávez used so well, pushing his authoritarian rule ten steps forward and then pivoting as he would take one back, he offered the possibility of dialogue and said the result could be the end of the Enabling Law a year earlier. The offer reeked of bait, and the opposition, at large, didn’t go for it. In the end, the executive powers granted by the Enabling Law stayed in place for the original 18 months. Unlike in other cases, the talks didn’t fall apart, they just didn’t happen.

February to April 2014: National Peace Conference 

  • Actors: Maduro’s government, the opposition alliance MUD, the Vatican and UNASUR.

After the 2014 protests, UNASUR and the Vatican sponsored dialogue between the government and MUD. This effort led to a six-hour-long televised dialogue with 22 speakers that quickly became an unfocused discussion with some additional private meetings.

Both parties agreed to establish a Truth Commission to investigate the casualties of the 2014 protests, discuss fulfilling vacancies in the TSJ and CNE and reconsider the humanitarian situation of political prisoner Iván Simonovis. The government only complied with the last one. The government continued to enforce violence against the protests, as well as its hunt of opposition leaders. The talks broke down after a month. Ramón Guillermo Aveledo, executive secretary of MUD, said they weren’t available for a situation in which they had to maintain an “appearance of dialogue.”

October 2016: Forum for Dialogue and Negotiations 

  • Actors: The opposition, the government, the Vatican, and UNASUR.

In 2016, Henrique Capriles led a recall referendum campaign against Maduro that was suspended by the Maduro-aligned CNE after it claimed that there had been fraud during the preliminary petition stage. This led to the emergence of protests. In the midst of these, the Vatican met with Maduro and convinced both parties to participate in a discussion of a five-point agenda moderated by the Vatican and UNASUR. The opposition withdrew from the talks after the government reneged on certain key accords: to allow humanitarian aid, reform the National Electoral Council (CNE) board, free jailed activists, and restore the National Assembly’s powers. Also, opposition leaders saw this as an attempt to stall until the deadline of the referendum.

Read More: Caracas Chronicles – Time after time: 20 years of negotiations in Venezuela 

La Patilla in English